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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal brought by Jadwiga Melton (hereinafter "Jadwiga") the personal
representative of the Estates of Robert Ernest Melton and Hedwig "Hedy" Melton, the
Appellant, in which Jadwiga challenges the District Judge's decision reversing the
Magistrate Judge's holding that Heinz Alt (hereinafter "Heinz"), the Respondent, failed
to bring a claim against the estate of his mother, Hedwig "Hedy" Melton (hereinafter
"Hedy"), within three years of her death, summary judgment was appropriate as
Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate was barred by the statute of limitations.
Factual History
Heinz is the biological son of Hedy and the stepson of her deceased husband, Robert
Ernest Melton (hereinafter "Robert"). (R. 229). Heinz alleges that he loaned money to his
mother and step-father to enable them to purchase land and build a log home in Boundary
County. (R. 230). Hedy and Robert first obtained title to the land on April 11, 1996. (R. 73).
On July 29, 1998, Hedy and Robert each executed a Last Will and Testament. On July 10, 1999,
the land was deeded to Heinz. (R. 74). Heinz alleges that the property was deeded to him as
security for the money he loaned to his mother and step-father. (R. 230). Subsequently,
Heinz and his wife deeded the land back to Hedy and Robert on November 4, 1999. (R.

75).
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Hedy died on August 11, 2008. (R. 230). At the time of her death, Hedy had a will
directing that all of her property would pass to Robert, and, in the event Robert preceded Hedy in
death, then all of her property would pass to Heinz. (R. 26). Hedy's will was never probated.
(R. 230).

Prior to December 2010, Robert's will mirrored Hedy's will and provided that ifhe
preceded Hedy in death, all of Robert's property would pass to her, and, if Hedy preceded him in
death, all of Robert's property would pass to Heinz. (R. 30). In 2010, Robert married
Jadwiga. (R. 230). Robert executed a new will in December of 2010 after marrying
Jadwiga. (R. 230). Robert died on July 4, 2013. (R. 230). At the time of his death,
Robert's will directed that all of his property would pass to Jadwiga. (R. 12). The only
assets of the estate are the land and home located in Bonners Ferry, Idaho. Heinz
maintains that Hedy and Robert purchased the land and constructed the home with
money he loaned to them. (R. 21-22).
Procedural History
On August 29, 2013, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Summary Administration of
Robert's estate pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-1205. (R. 10). On August 30, 2013, a Decree
Vesting Estate in Surviving Spouse was entered. (R. 19).
On September 6, 2013, Heinz filed a Motion to Convert Proceedings to Supervised
Administration and to Determine Testacy based on his claim that he is entitled to repayment
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of the money he loaned Hedy and Robert to purchase the land and construct the home at
issue. (R 21-23). On October 21, 2013, an Order Setting Aside the Decree Vesting Estate
in Surviving Spouse was entered. (R. 39).
On December 9, 2014, Jadwiga filed a Petition for Formal Probate of Will and
Formal Appointment of Personal Representative. (R. 41). Because Hedy's will was never
probated, Jadwiga requested that the estates of both Hedy and Robert be joined for probate
in one proceeding. (R. 41-44). This was done pursuant to LC.§ 15-3-111.
On January 13, 2015, Heinz filed a claim for $102,574.50 against the estate based on LC.
§ 15-3-804. (R. 4 7). Heinz submitted several unauthenticated documents to support his claim.
(R. 50-54). On February 2, 2015, Jadwiga was appointed the personal representative of the
estates of Robert and Hedy. (R. 55). On February 9, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Notice to
Creditors with the Court. (R. 5). The notice was first published in the Bonners Ferry
Herald on February 19, 2015. (R. 58). On March 13, 2015, Jadwiga mailed a Notice of
Disallowance of Claim to Heinz's attorney. (R. 80). The Notice of Disallowance was filed
with the Court on March 17, 2015. (R. 58). Heinz was informed that his claim was being
disallowed for the following reasons: (1) the claim was untimely because Heinz failed to
bring it within three years of Hedy's death, (2) Heinz failed to provide documentation that
Robert owed a debt to him, and (3) Hedy's signature on the documents submitted by Heinz
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had not been authenticated. (R. 148-149). On May 4, 2015, Heinz filed a Petition to Allow
Claims. (R. 59).
On June 29, 2015, Jadwiga filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to Deny Creditor
Claim. (R. 69-70). A hearing was held on August 24, 2015. (R. 150-55). On October 8,
2015, Magistrate Judge Justin W. Julian issued his Memorandum Opinion granting
Jadwiga's Motion for Summary Judgment in part. (R. 198-205). Specifically, Judge Julian
concluded that Jadwiga's disallowance of Heinz's creditor claim was timely, and that Heinz's
claim against Hedy's estate is barred by LC. § 15-3-803 because Heinz failed to bring his
claim within three years of Hedy's death. (R. 201-04). The Magistrate Judge expressly
stated that "Heinz may still proceed with his claim against Robert's estate." (R. 204). On
December 3, 2015, the Magistrate Judge entered a Judgment on the above two issues and
certified it as a final judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). (R. 206). On February 27, 2017
a Second Amended Judgment was entered. (R. 434).
On January 13, 2016, Heinz filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 208). An Amended Notice of
Appeal was filed by Heinz on March 2, 2016. (R. 216). Oral argument was heard on October 7,
2016. (R. 315-16). The District Court affirmed the disallowance of Heinz's creditor claim was
timely and reversed the Magistrate Court's determination that Heinz's claim against Hedy's
estate is barred by LC. § 15-3-803 because Heinz failed to bring his claim within three years
of Hedy's death. (R. 317-334).
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II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law by reversing the Magistrate Court's decision
that Heinz Alt's claim against the Estate of Hedwig "Hedy" Melton is barred by Idaho Code§
15-3-803?
A.

The District Court erred as a matter of law by construing the statutory language of LC. §
15-3-111 against its plain and ordinary meaning.

B.

The District Court erred by not considering legislative intent before construing LC. § 153-111 and in the event a legislative history analysis is proper, the legislative history of
LC. § 15-3-111 does not indicate a legislative intent to extend the creditor claim
limitation period.

C.

The District Court improperly applied rules of statutory construction in construing LC. §
15-3-111.
1.

The District Court erred by allowing words to be added to LC. § 15-3-111.

2.

Marshall v. Department of Transportation and the statutory rule favoring specific

statutes over general statutes was misapplied to the facts of this matter.
3.

Enforcing the statutory creditor claim period in the context of joint probate does
not produce an absurd result.

4.

A strict three (3) year creditor claim period in the context of a joint probate does
not lead to an unreasonably harsh result.
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5.

Enforcing the creditor claim limitation period in the context of joint probate does
not produce an absurd result, because a creditor can and must timely assert their
claim.

D.

Jadwiga is entitled to her costs and attorney's fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. §§ 54(d)-(e)(2)

and LC. 15-8-208.

III.

ST AND ARD OF REVIEW

"When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the Supreme Court applies the same
standard of review that was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary
judgment." In re Estate of Ortega, 153 Idaho 609,612, 288 P.3d 826, 829 (2012) (quoting

Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B. V, 148 Idaho 89,101,218 P.3d 1150, 1162 (2009)).
Summary judgment is proper, "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
The Supreme Court freely reviews the interpretation of a statute and its application to the
facts. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,474, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007). The primary
function of the court is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent and such intent
should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue. George W Watkins Family v.

Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990). When a statute is
ambiguous, the determination of the meaning of the statute and its application is also a matter of
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law over which this Court exercises free review. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134
Idaho 130,134,997 P.2d 591, 595 (2000); JR. Simplot Co. v. Western Heritage Ins. Co., 132
Idaho 582,584,977 P.2d 196, 198 (1999).

IV.

ARGUMENT

This is a case of first impression in Idaho, the central issue being the proper rules to apply
when engaging in a question of statutory interpretation and construction. Jadwiga asserts the
District Court erred when it departed from Idaho's standard method of interpretation when it held
LC. § 15-3-111 extends the creditor claim limitations period of LC. § 15-3-803 which reversed
the Magistrate's holding.
Under established Idaho law, courts faced with a question of statutory interpretation must
first examine the literal words of the statute. A statute that is unambiguous should be construed
by its plain and ordinary meaning. Where a statute is ambiguous, courts then look to the
legislative history of the statute to aid in interpretation. If the intent of the legislature is unclear,
then courts have occasion to consider additional rules of statutory construction. In failing to
consider the plain language and legislative history of LC. § 15-3-111 the District Court erred in
its analysis. Here, the plain language of LC.§ 15-3-111 is unambiguous and only extends the
limitation period of LC.§ 15-3-108. Further, the legislative history of LC.§ 15-3-111 does not
suggest a legislative intent to extend the creditor claim limitations period of LC.§ 15-3-803.
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Lastly, under Idaho's additional rules of statutory construction, LC. § 15-3-803 is unaffected by
the language of LC.§ 15-3-111.
A.

The District Court erred as a matter of law by construing the statutory language of
I.C. § 15-3-111 against its plain and ordinary meaning.

Idaho courts have stated that a court errs when it does not give statutory language its
plain, obvious, and ordinary meaning. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659 978 P.2d 214,219
(1999); see also Bonner County v. Cunningham, 156 Idaho 291,295,323 P.3d 1252, 1256 (Ct.
App. 2014). Interpretation of a statute begins with its literal words. Bonner County, 156 Idaho at
295. If a statute is unambiguous, a court should not construe it, merely follow the law as written.
Bonner County, 156 Idaho at 295, 323 P.3d at 1256; see also Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,895,265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011).

In the present case, the "joint probate" statute known as LC.§ 15-3-111 is simply stated
and its literal meaning clear. LC.§ 15-3-111 reads as follows:
In cases in which a marital community has been dissolved by the
death of either spouse at any time, the survivor was then entitled to
all of the property of the decedent by will, law, or both, and the
survivor died before any proceeding had been commenced for the
probate of the estate of the spouse whose death occurred first, the
estates of both decedents may be joined for probate in a single
proceeding in any court having jurisdiction of the estate of the
spouse whose death occurred last. The three (3) year provision of
section 15-3-108 Idaho Code applies only to the death of the spouse
whose death occurred last. The initial application or petition filed
in any such joint proceeding shall contain a statement of the facts
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upon which such joint proceeding is based, in addition to all other
statements re_guired by this code to be made therein.
LC.§ 15-3-111.
The language of the statute is precise and should be construed by its literal words - no
more, no less. Those words do not include an extension of the time for creditors to file claims
against the first spouse who died. There is no reference to LC.§ 15-3-803 nor creditor claims in
any portion of the language. As Judge Julian stated in his Memorandum Opinion:
There is nothing in this section [LC. § 15-3-111] that states or
suggests any tolling of a creditor's deadline to present a claim, just
because the estate is subsequently jointly probated. Indeed, this
section specifically exempts the three (3) year limitation on probate
following death of the first spouse, as found in section 108. That fact
clearly demonstrates the legislature's ability and willingness to make
special exceptions within this particular provision where warranted
and intended. As there is no exception made to the three (3) year
creditors' bar found in 15-3-803, one shall not be implied by the
court. Heinz's claim against Hedy's estate was not filed or
"presented" within three years of her death and is now barred by IC
§ 15-3-803(a)(l).
(R. 331).
The District Court, in its Opinion on Appeal, includes the above stated quote, but does
not engage in its own analysis of the plain language of the statute or legislative history. (R. 331).
Without finding the statue ambiguous, it construed the statute using additional rules of statutory
construction. (R. 331-32). However, this Court has made clear that a court engages in statutory
construction only where there is ambiguity. Bonner County, 156 Idaho at 295,323 P.3d at 1256.
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Further, a finding of ambiguity requires more than presentation of conflicting interpretations. Id.
"A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction." Id. "A statute is not ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise more
than one interpretation of it." Id. "If that were the test then all statutes whose meanings are
contested in litigation could be considered ambiguous." Id.
Despite this Court's clear guidance, the District Court did not apply well established rules
of statutory construction and so erred in its interpretation of LC. § 15-3-111. Under Idaho law
examination of the plain language of a statute precedes the application of additional rules of
statutory construction. This Court noted that a court cannot deviate from existing law by
applying rules of statutory construction without first examining the literal words of the statute
and determining whether or not it is ambiguous. Bonner County, 156 Idaho at 295,323 P.3d at
1256; see also In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho 345, 349-50, 326 P.3d 347, 351-52 (2014). In
that case, this Court found that the magistrate's application of a rule of statutory construction (in
pari materia) was unnecessary and in error where the language in question was unambiguous.
Id. at 351, 326 P.3d at 353. Further, this Court held that rules of statutory construction are

inapplicable to unambiguous statutes, because "the clearly expressed intent of the legislative
body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory
construction." Id. (citing Payette River Property Owner's Assn. v. Board. of Com 'rs. Of Valley
County, 132 Idaho 551,557,979 P.2d 477,483 (1999)).
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In the case at hand, the District Court erred by considering the effect of statutory
construction rules without first analyzing the plain language of the statute for ambiguity. Under
the holding of In re Adoption ofDoe, the District Court's deviation from existing law is
reversible error.
B.

The District Court erred by not considering legislative intent before construing I.C.
§ 15-3-111 which does not indicate a legislative intent to extend the creditor claim
limitation period.
If this Court finds the words ofl.C. § 15-3-111 ambiguous, then it must look to the

legislative intent, and in construing a statute, may examine the language used, the reasonableness
of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Kelso & Irwin, P.A., at 134,
997 P.2d at 595. "In attempting to discern and implement the intent of the legislature, the court
may seek edification from the statute's legislative history and contemporaneous context at
enactment." State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999). Extrinsic aids
such as the statute's heading may be used to construe an ambiguous statute. State v. Moore, 111
Idaho 854, 727 P.2d 1282 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986); see also Local 1494 of Intern. Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630,641,586 P.2d 1346, 1356-57 (1978).
Previous to adopting the Uniform Probate Code (hereinafter "UPC") in 1971, Idaho's
legislature had enacted I.C. § 15-313 in 1937 which provided for ajoinder of probates. I.C. §
15-313 reads as follows:
When a marital community is dissolved by the death of either
member thereof, thereafter, if the survivor should die before
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proceedings shall have been commenced for the probate of the estate
of the person who first died, and both have died intestate the estates
of both of the said decedents may, by order of the court, be joined
for probate in a single proceeding in any probate court having
jurisdiction of either estate; provided the same person is, under the
provisions of section 15-312, entitled to letters of administration in
both estates and consents so to act. The procedure to be followed
shall be similar in all respects to that prescribed for the probate of
the estate of the male member of a former marital community who
has died intestate.
LC.§ 15-313. Upon adoption of the UPC, LC.§ 15-313 was repealed leaving no method for
joint probate until the enactment of LC.§ 15-3-111.
LC.§ 15-3-111 was originally adopted in 1973 and the legislative purpose for adopting
LC.§ 15-3-111 was to "fill certain gaps left out of the original probate code." S. B. 419, 1973
Leg., 42nd Sess. (Idaho 1973) (Statement of Purpose). As before, this statute allows the estates of
two deceased spouses to be joined for probate in a single proceeding in any court having
jurisdiction of the estate of the spouse whose death occurred last. LC.§ 15-3-111. The original
language of LC.§ 15-3-111 did not include reference to its effect upon surrounding statutes in
the Idaho probate code.
In 1995, LC.§ 15-3-111 was amended by Senate Bill No. 1166 to add: "[t]he three (3)
year provision of section 15-3-108, Idaho Code, applies only to the death of the spouse whose
death occurred last." The title of Senate Bill No. 1166 reads:
An act relating to probate of wills and administration; amending
section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, to clarify the application of a
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provision of another statute [I.C. § 15-3-108] to the death of the
spouse whose death occurs last.
S. B. 1166, 1995 Leg., 53rd Sess. (Idaho 1995) (emphasis added).
The language of Senate Bill No. 1166 does not suggest a legislative intent to extend the
time limitations in both I.C. §§ 15-3-108 and 15-3-803. First, the Senate Bill is written with
reference to a singular, not plural, provision of "another" statute. Second, Idaho recognizes the
rule of 17expressio unius est exclusion alterius, a Latin phrase meaning: "where a construction
or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others. " Local
1494 of Intern. Ass 'n of Firefighters, 99 Idaho at 639, 586 P.2d at 1355. Logically, if a statute

specifies its effect upon a singular statute, the reference should be exclusive. There is no
reference to creditor claims in the original statute or in its amendment.
In its Memorandum Opinion, the District Court erred in its determination that the creditor
claim period of I.C. § 15-3-803 of the first spouse to die was tolled when a joint probate was
opened. The 1995 amendment to I.C. § 15-3-111 cannot be interpreted to include both the three
(3) year provisions of LC.§§ 15-3-108 and 15-3-803 because there is no reference to LC.§ 15-3803 within the statute or its history.
As an aside, LC.§ 15-3-111 cannot impliedly include both three year periods for the
simple fact that it would have been impossible at the time of the amendment. In 1995, LC. § 153-803 set forth a two year limitation upon the presentment of claims. LC.§ 15-3-803 (1991)
(amended 2004 ). It was not until 2004 that a three year limitation period for creditor claims was
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added to Idaho's Probate Code. Unless the legislature foresaw that the nonclaim statute would
be extended to a three year limitation almost a decade later, it would be illogical to read LC. §
15-3-111 to include the limitation period of LC. § 15-3-803.
It is assumed this inconsistency, with regard to the two year limitation period, is one that
the Idaho Legislature would have been aware of at the time of the 1995 amendment. Idaho has
acknowledged the breadth of the legislature's knowledge of the law and consideration of the
same:
A statute is to be construed as a whole without separating one
provision from another. The Court should also construe statues
under the assumption that the legislature knew of all legal precedent
and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was passed.

State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659, 978 P.2d 214 (1999).
The legislative history ofI.C. § 15-3-111, as a whole, does not support a contention that
the Idaho Legislature intended to expand the limitation period for creditor claims in the context
of a joint probate proceeding.

C.

The District Court improperly applied rules of statutory construction in construing
I.C. § 15-3-111.
In addition to the foregoing analysis, the Appellant requests this court consider how the

meaning of LC. § 15-3-111 is developed under Idaho's additional cannons of construction. As a
general rule, courts cannot insert into statutes terms or provisions which are not there. A court
may, however, look to a number of factors which aid in construing an ambiguous statute. For
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example, a court may favor a more specific statute over one that is more general, or where there
are two statutes that conflict, but do not necessarily address the same subject matter, a court may
look to the one enacted later in time. Finally, a court may construe an ambiguous statute in a
manner that avoids absurd or harsh results. The issues discussed in this section involve whether
the District Court correctly applied these cannons of construction when construing LC. § 15-3111.

1.

The District Court erred by allowing words to be added to I.C. § 15-3-111.
The District Court erred by adopting Heinz's assertion, that joint probate revives a

creditor's ability to enforce a claim that is otherwise foreclosed by the limitation period set forth
in LC.§ 15-3-803. (R. 242, 332). As an initial matter, courts "cannot insert into statutes terms
or provisions which are obviously not there." Matter ofAdoption of Chaney, 126 Idaho 554,
558, 887 P .2d 1061, 1065 ( 1995). It is well established in Idaho that courts should not secondguess the wisdom of statutes or insert words the Court believes the legislature left out, be it
intentionally or inadvertently. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Gooding County, 159
Idaho 84, 89,356 P.3d 377,382 (2015). For the legislative power is vested in the Senate and
House of Representatives, rather than the courts. Id.
Courts are not only divested of legislative power, but the Idaho Legislature can and has
exercised its power to create other extensions or special exceptions to the creditor limitation
period of LC.§ 15-3-803 and have done so regarding summary administration and in recovery
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of certain assistance provided by Medicaid. These extensions or special exceptions will be
discussed in more detail below. In these two instances, both of which are more recent than the
1995 amendment to LC. § 15-3-111, the Idaho Legislature added words to the statutes which
creates an extension or special exception for the time for creditors to file claims. In both
circumstances, the extension or special exception is clear as it is expressly stated in the
language of the statute. In contrast, the legislature chose not to add any such language to LC. §
15-3-111 and the District Court improperly read an extension or special exception into the
statute.
The District Court's Opinion on Appeal, appears to adopt Heinz's position, that opening
of a probate estate and appointment of a personal representative should trigger the time limit for
submitting a claim. In its opinion, the District Court states first that "the three year limitation for
creditors in LC.§ 15-3-803 (a)(l) parallels the general time limit for probating an estate." (R.
329). It goes on to state that because the three year limit for probating an estate applies to the
death of the spouse whose death occurred last, so then must the period for bringing a creditor
claim. (R. 332). Such assertion ignores the plain language of LC.§ 15-3-803(a) which
establishes a time limit for filing claims starting at the date of death. LC. § 15-3-803(a)(l).
Moreover, it inserts words and intentions that appear in no part of LC.§ 15-3-111 's language or
history.
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If the Legislature wished to create an extension or special exception in the context of

joint probate, it easily could have done so. It did not. There are only two extensions or special
exceptions to the time frames set forth in LC. § 15-3-803. In the first instance, a surviving
spouse may use the summary administration process as provided under LC.§ 15-3-1205.
The legislature amended LC.§ 15-3-108, effective July 1, 2014, to provide that the three
year statute of limitations on probate proceedings does not apply to summary administration
under LC. § 15-3-1205. In addition, LC. § 15-3-1205 expressly states that a surviving spouse
must "assume and be liable for any and all indebtedness that might be a claim against the
estate of the decedent and there will be no administration of the estate of the decedent." LC.
§ 15-3-1205(c). With regard to summary administration, the Legislature specifically
addressed claims against the estate. In 1995, the Legislature amended LC.§ 15-3-111, and
did not create any extension or special exception to the filing of creditor claims when a joint
probate was commenced. If the Legislature had wanted to toll the creditor claims for the first
spouse who died, it could have easily made that amendment. It did not.
Similarly, LC. § 56-218 was amended in 2006 to expressly provide an extension or
special exception to the limitation period for Medicaid recovery claims. For many years, the
statute provided that recovery could be made from the individual's estate, and the estate of the
spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both, but there would be no adjustment or recovery
until the death of the surviving spousr LC. §56-218 (2005). However, the Court in In re Estate
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of Kaminsky held the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department) was

barred from recovery on their claim because the Department had not timely presented a claim
against the estate pursuant to LC. § 15-3-803. In re Estate of Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436, 438-39,
111 P.3d 121, 123-24 (2005). In response to this holding, the Idaho legislature amended LC.§
56-218 to provide that no claim needed to be filed on the death of the first spouse, unless actual
notice was given of the probate, or unless a joint probate were opened under LC. § 15-3-111.
The reason for the change was given as follows:
Section Two amends Idaho Code§ 56-218 to clarify the presentation
and collection of estate recovery claims by Health & Welfare. A
number of clarifications are made by repositioning language or
stating the existing concept more clearly. Under existing law, if the
institutionalized spouse, who received Medicaid, dies leaving a
surviving spouse, no actual collection is made, but a "claim" must
be sent to the personal representative of the estate of deceased
institutionalized spouse, or if no probate is done, to the surviving
spouse. This can be very frightening to the surviving spouse, who
often does not understand that no current reimbursement is being
demanded. Therefor[e] [sic], the bill both clarifies that no recovery
is made until both spouses are deceased and also removes the
requirement to send a claim if no probate is filed at the first death.
S. B. 1318, 2006 Leg., 53th Sess. (Idaho 2006).
LC. § 56-218 was amended in 2006 to include a reference to LC. § 15-3-111 which
provides for an expanded recovery for estate recovery claims for Health and Welfare with joint
probates. LC. § 15-3-803 was not amended to allow expanded recovery for creditors when a
joint probate is commenced. LC.§§ 15-3-111 and 15-3-803 do not overlap in words or by
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legislative history and construing the former as inclusive of the latter runs afoul ofldaho's
statutory construction rules.
2.

Marshall v. Department of Transportation and the statutory rule favoring
specific statutes over general statutes was misapplied to the facts of this
matter.

The Court below relied upon Marshall v. Department of Transportation for the
rule which states: "the more general statute should not be interpreted as encompassing an area
already covered by one which is more specific." Marshall v. Department ofTransp., 137 Idaho

337,341, 48 P.3d 666, 670 (Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis added). However, the rule requires that
the two statutes address the same subject matter. State v. Betterton, 127 Idaho 562, 564, 903
P.2d 151, 153 (Ct. App. 1995).
The District Court misapplied this rule because the statutes at issue do not address the
same subject matter. A more specific statute that does not address the same subject matter as a
more general statute does not fall within the purview of the rule. Betterton, 127 Idaho at 564,
903 P.2d at 153. LC.§ 15-3-803 sets limitations on presentation of claims. LC.§ 15-3-111 on
its face does nothing to address the time frame for presenting a claim, but refers to the process of
opening a probate in a certain instance. These two statutes do not address the same subject
matter so the rule stated in Marshall does not apply.
While the rule favoring specific statutes over general statutes may not apply under the
facts of this case, a sister rule which appears hand-in-hand with it may be applicable under the
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facts of this case. Regardless of whether the two statutes address the same subject matter, an
inconsistency in their effect may still arise. When two statutes are irreconcilable, the rule is the
one enacted later in time prevails. In re Estate of Wiggins, 155 Idaho 116, 123,306 P.3d 201,
208 (2013) (citing Mickelsen v. City of Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305,307,612 P.2d 542,544 (1980)).
It is undisputed that LC.§ 15-3-111 extends the general three year timeframe in which to

file a probate action. Consequently, in cases such as this one, LC. § 15-3-111 is the specific
statute, while LC. § 15-3-108 is a more general statute. These two statutes cover the same
subject matter- the opening of a probate. Unlike, the interplay between those two statutes, LC.
§§ 15-3-111 and 15-3-803(a)(l) do not cover the same subject matter. The analysis of whether
LC.§ 15-3-111 is more specific becomes unnecessary.
However, to the extent that LC.§§ 15-3-111 and 15-3-803 conflict, LC.§ 15-3-803 is the
later enacted statute. LC.§ 15-3-111 was last amended in 1997 (to provide the three year
limitation to open a probate only extended to the spouse who died last), whereas LC.§ 15-3-803
was last amended seven years later in 2004 (to extend the statute oflimitations from two years to
/

three years from date of death). If the legislature had wanted the provisions of LC.§ 15-3-803 to
be tolled in the event a joint probate was commenced, it could have made that amendment. It did
not. This Court should reverse the holding of the District Court and reaffirm the Magistrate
Court's decision that the time to present claims in Hedy's estate ended three years after her
death.
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3.

Enforcing the statutory creditor claim period in the context of joint probate
does not produce an absurd result.

As noted above, I.C. § 15-3-111 expressly provides that a joint probate can be
commenced only when the martial community of a couple ended at the death of the first spouse,
and the surviving spouse was entitled to all of the deceased spouse's property by will, law or
both, and no probate had been commenced on the death of the deceased spouse. The reason this
rule is needed is LC. § 15-3-108 only allows three years for the probate of a will in Idaho. After
three years have elapsed, a probate cannot be opened. This statute specifically states that,
although the probates can be combined, the three year rule to probate the Will only applies to the
spouse who died last.
In Idaho, it is common to find many instances wherein the first spouse dies and the
surviving spouse does not open a probate. When all the assets are titled in joint names and the
surviving spouse is not hindered in his or her ability to gain access or have control over the
remaining assets, the surviving spouse may not view a probate as necessary. However, to
transfer real property, a legal action must commence.
Allowing the use ofl.C. § 15-3-111 saves time and judicial economy by probating both
estates in one proceeding. This process is used almost exclusively to transfer real property, such
as in this case. This comports with the goal of the UPC Idaho adopted in 1971. As stated by this
Court "[t]his code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes
and policies." Subsection (b) states that, "[t]he underlying purposes and policies of this code are:
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(1) to simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents ... ; (3) to promote a
speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of the decedent and making distribution to
his successors. In Re Estate of Elliott, 141 Idaho 177, 181, 108 P.3d 324, 328 (2005).
The District Court, in its Opinion on Appeal, found that LC. § 15-3-111, if applied under
its plain meaning, would lead to an absurd or unreasonably harsh result. (R. 332). The
Honorable Judge Stegner wrote, "If the statute oflimitations for the first to die is not tolled, then
in effect the only estate to probate is that of the second to die." (R. 332).
The issue of transferring real property may only arise after the death of the surviving
spouse, making joint probate an economical decision. If a joint probate were not available, the
heirs or devisees who are to receive real property would be forced to commence a quiet title
action or seek determination of heirs in order to transfer the property from the first spouse to die.
At the same time, the heirs or devisees would have to open probate as a second and separate
proceeding to transfer the real property from the second spouse to die. The operation of a joint
probate furthers the goal of the UPC to simplify the law and to promote a speedy and efficient
system to transfer assets. A joint probate allows the estate of the second spouse to die to be
probated and to finalize transfer of real property held in the name of the first spouse to die.
4.

A strict three year creditor claim period in the context of a joint probate does
not lead to an unreasonably harsh result.

Courts recognize that limiting the time for a creditor claim to bring is reasonable
and does not lead to harsh results. The court below stated "[ c]onstructions of a statute that would
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lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored." (R. 333) (citing State v. Yager, 139
Idaho 680, 690, 85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004)). In Idaho, words of a statute should be given their
plain meaning, unless a contrary legislative purpose is expressed or the plain meaning creates an
absurd result. KGF Development, LLC v. City of Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524,528,236 P.3d 1284,
1288 (2010). Yet, the Idaho Supreme Court has never "revised or voided an unambiguous
statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when construed as
written and [does not have] the authority to do so." Verska, 151 Idaho at 8~6, 265 P.3d at 509.
Idaho Courts have recognized time and again the statute of limitations for creditors to file
a claim runs from the date of death of the person who died. See In re Estate of Kaminsky, 141
Idaho at 439, (a claim filed more than two years after date of death but within a year of opening
probate is disallowed as not timely filed (citing LC. § 15-3-803 which provided a two year claim
period)); Holt v. Mickelson, 41 Idaho 694,696,242 P. 977 (1925) (nonclaim statutes are short
and highly penal, and should not be extended beyond the intent of the Legislature).
Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States in Tulsa v. Pope emphasized the
importance of nonclaim statutes and their role in regulating the timeliness of claims. Tulsa v.
Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1998). There the court noted that nonclaim statutes are almost universally

included in state probate codes. Id. at 479. While the holding in Pope involved due process of
notice to creditors in probate proceedings, that court, in dicta, also recognized a state's interest in
the need for prompt administration of claims. The Supreme Court stated that "[d]eath transforms
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the decedent's legal relationships and a State could reasonably conclude that swift settlement of
estate is so important that it calls for very short time deadlines for filing claims." Id. at 489.
Also, that the purpose and effect of nonclaim statutes is to regulate the timeliness of claims and
forever bar untimely claims. Id. at 488. Thus, under Pope, a state's creation of short time
limitation on bringing a claim is not absurd.
After a review of other states who have adopted the UPC, Idaho is the only one that has
adopted the unique language found in LC.§ 15-3-111. However, Utah has adopted Utah Code§
75-3-109 which reads as follows:
(1) Upon petition by any person interested in two or more estates,
the court may, after notice and hearing, grant letters upon these
estates jointly if administration has not commenced with respect to
any such estate and if:
(a)
All or any part of the estate of one decedent has
descended from another decedent; or
(b) Two or more decedents held any property during their
lifetimes as tenants-in-common and if the persons entitled under the
wills of these decedents or under the law of intestate succession to
receive the estates of these decedents are the same.
(2) Ifletters are granted upon two or more estates jointly under this
section, these estates shall be administered the same as if they were
but one estate except that claims may be enforced only against the
estate to which they relate.
Utah Code§ 75-3-109
This is consistent with the Estate's argument set forth above. Accordingly, Idaho's UPC
applies a maximum three-year limitations period on the presentment of creditor claims which
beings to run on the decedent's death and not upon the death of his or her successors, except in
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the case of Medicaid recovery as noted above. This rule is also stated in the official comment to
Uniform Probate Code§ 3-317 which states as follows:
In succession without administration, there being no personal
representative's notice to creditors, the short non-claim period under
UPC Section 3-803(a)(l) does not apply and creditors are subject to
the statutes of limitations and the limitation of three years on
decedent's creditors when no notice is published under UPC Section
3-803(a)(2). The general statutes oflimitation are suspended for four
months following the decedent's death but resume thereafter under
UPC Section 3-802. The assumption of liability by the universal
successors upon the issuance of the Statement of Universal
Succession is deemed to be by operation oflaw and does not operate
to extend or renew any statute of limitations that had begun to run
against the decedent. The result is that creditors are barred by
the general statutes of limitation or 3 years whichever is the
shorter. (Emphasis added).
Unif Probate Code§ 3-317 (amended 2010) (Comment).
I.C. § 15-3-111 provides a means of effectively passing property of joint estates and
contains no tolling provisions on the presentment of creditor claims for the first spouse who died.
Thus, the Idaho Code plainly limits the presentation of creditor claims against an estate to a
maximum of three years after the decedent's death regardless of whether the surviving spouse's
estate exercises the right to jointly probate the estates of both spouses. The Appellant urges this
Court to find that I.C. § 15-3-111 does not enlarge the statute of limitations and reverse the
District Court's decision.
If this Court agrees with the ruling of the district court below, a practitioner would never
use I.C. § 15-3-111 for fear of resurrecting some latent claim of the first spouse who died
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several years prior. In this instance, Hedy died five years before Robert. If Hedy had died
ten years or twenty years before Robert, the District Court's holding would allow Hedy's
creditors to bring claims in Robert's estate by virtue of opening a joint probate under I.C. §
15-3-111. This cannot be what the legislature intended. Tolling the statute of limitations
just because a joint probate is commenced leads to an absurd result and runs afoul of the
underlying purposes and policies of the UPC.
5.

Enforcing the creditor claim limitation period in the context of joint probate
does not produce an absurd result, because a creditor can and must timely
assert their claim.

Enforcing the nonclaim period against a creditor, in the context of joint probate, is
not absurd because a creditor may enforce a claim within the statutory period by opening
probate. Idaho law protects creditors from having their claim foreclosed by the passage of time,
by giving creditors the ability to open a probate if none were opened. A creditor can, at any time
45 days after the death of decedent, open a probate as a creditor of the decedent's estate. I.C. §
15-3-203(a)(6).

It is true that administration of an estate is necessary to enforce a claim and that no
proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent may be commenced before the
appointment of a personal representative. I.C. § 15-3-104. However, a creditor is empowered to
seek appointment as personal representative and open probate proceedings.
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Not only may a creditor open probate in order to enforce his claim, he must exercise
reasonable diligence in attempting to save his claim against the estate from the bar of a statute of
limitations. Gwinn v. Melvin, 9 Idaho 202,210 72 P. 961,962 (1903). A creditor "cannot
without good cause or reason defer making application [for probate] until the statute of
limitations has run, and then successfully contend that said statute was suspended on account of
the nonappointment of an administrator." Id. Under Idaho case law then, creditors are not
prevented from enforcing their claim when a third party neglects to open probate and are instead
required to open probate themselves in order to protect a claim. While this law predates the
enactment of the joint probate statute, both Idaho courts and its legislature both required a
creditor to enforce its claims long before the joint probate statute was enacted. The absurd result
would be to reward a creditor who sits on his rights, only to be afforded a second chance at
collection in the event joint probate is eventually opened.
D.

Jadwiga is entitled to her costs and attorney's fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)-(e)(2
and J.C. 15-8-208.
Jadwiga requests an award of her costs and attorney's fees on appeal based upon LR.C.P.

54(d)-(e)(2). Under LR.C.P 54(d), costs are allowed as a matter ofright to prevailing parties
unless otherwise ordered by the court. LR.C.P. 54 (d)(l)(A). Under LR.C.P 54(e), attorney fees
may be awarded to a prevailing party when provided for by any statute or where allowed under
LC. § 12-121. LR.C.P. 54(e)(l)-(2). Jadwiga requests a statutory award of her costs and
attorney's fees on appeal based on LC. § 15-8-208.
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The Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (hereinafter "TEDRA") governs all matters
concerning the estates and assets of deceased persons. LC.§ 15-8-102(l)(a). Matters under this
section include any question arising in the administration of an estate. LC. § 15-8-103(1 )( c).
Jadwiga timely disallowed the claim filed by Heinz and sought a determination the claim was
barred by the statute oflimitations in Hedy's estate. This is a question regarding the
administration of the estate and within the general powers given the courts in the TEDRA
statutes.
As part of TEDRA, LC. § 15-8-208 grants the court discretion to award costs, including
reasonable attorney fees in proceedings involving decedent's estates. LC. § 15-8-208 reads as
follows:
"(1) Either the district court or the court on appeal may, in its discretion, order
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be awarded to any party:
(a) From any party to the proceedings;
(b) From the assets of the estate or trust involved in the proceedings; or
(c) From any nonprobate asset that is the subject of the proceedings. The
court may order the costs to be paid in such amount and in such manner as
the court determines to be equitable.
(2) This section applies to all proceedings governed by this chapter including,
but not limited to, proceedings involving trusts, decedent's estates and
properties, and guardianship matters. Except as provided in section 12-117,
Idaho Code, this section shall not be construed as being limited by any other
specific statutory provision providing for the payment of costs, unless such statute
specifically provides otherwise."

LC. § 15-8-208 (emphasis added).
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Heinz petitioned the court to allow his claim under LC. § 15-3-806. Heinz sought an
order directing the personal representative to pay his claim. Payment of allowed claims is a
matter concerning the estate and is a part of the administration of the estate. The appeal to the
District Court and the appeal to this Court are a result of that petition. Because Heinz sought
resolution of a dispute involving an estate matter governed by TEDRA, this court may apply
TEDRA's attorney fee provision. This Court may, in its discretion, award Jadwiga's costs
including reasonable attorney fees from Heinz.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Jadwiga respectfully requests that this Court hold that LC. §
15-3-111 does not create an extension or special exception to the creditor claim period set forth
in LC. § 15-3-803, reversing the District Court's ruling and affirming the ruling of the Magistrate
Court. In addition, Jadwiga respectfully requests an award of costs and attorney's fees on
appeal.
DATED this

[ff- day of April, 2017.
CUSACK LAW FIRM, PLLC.
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